NOTES
CONGRESSIONAL VETO OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION: TIE PROBABLE RESPONSE TO A
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
As the size, complexity, and regulatory jurisdiction of federal

administrative agencies have expanded, charges of arbitrary and unreasonable conduct on the part of the agencies become increasingly common.1 In particular, it is frequently alleged that the agencies' autonomy
and lack of accountability cause them to lose touch with economic and
political reality and to operate in a rarified atmosphere of legal abstraction and statutory dogma.2 Ironically, nowhere has the criticism been
more intense than among the members of Congress, the creators of the
regulatory agencies. 3 The thrust of the arguments in defense of the
agencies has been that independence is necessary for effective regulation, and that the agencies have in fact been responsive when bureaucratic inequities are called to their attention.4
In response to the criticism, a number of remedial legislative
proposals have recently been put before Congress. 5 The most sweeping
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Hearings on H.R. 3658 and H.R. 8231 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings (Because the official bound volume
of these hearings arrived just prior to publication, page number citations to those statements appearing in the bound volume will be found in the parentheses following the
date)];
Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEo. WASH. L,
Rnv. 467 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Cooper & Cooper];
Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and
Committees, 66 H,Iv. L. REV. 569 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Ginnane];
Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive,
63 CALw. L. REV. 983 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Watson].
1. See, e.g., Russell, Hill Eyes Its Own Veto Power, Washington Post, Dec. 27,
1975, § A, at 2, col. 1.
2. Id. See also Statement of Rep. Mark Andrews, House Hearings, Oct. 21, 1975;
Statement of Harold E. Ford, Executive Director, Southeastern Poultry & Egg Ass'n,
House Hearings, Oct. 23, 1975 (208); Kilpatrick, The OSHA Box Score: Business 2,
Bureaucrats0, Raleigh News and Observer, Mar. 3, 1976, at 5, col. 1.
3. See Russell, supra note 1; 121 CONG. Ry. 10,204 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975)
(remarks of Mr. Butler).
4. See Statement of Robert J. Lewis, General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission,
House Hearings, Oct. 31, 1975 (463); Statement of Bert Concklin, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, House Hearings, Oct. 23, 1975
(477).
5. The various proposals are summarized in Russell, supra note 1. For a descrip-
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reform proposals are embodied in two bills currently being heard in
committee, House Bill 82316 and House Bill 3658. 7 Though they differ
somewhat in scope of application, the broad purpose of both bills is to
require that rules being promulgated by federal agencies be presented to
Congress for evaluation before becoming effective. Under both bills,
either house of Congress could prevent implementation of a regulation
by adopting a resolution of disapproval before the expiration of a
statutory waiting period. A regulation not expressly disapproved within
the statutory period would take effect automatically."
The idea of congressional oversight of the executive branch is not
new,0 and its history, substantive merits, and constitutional implications
tion of the two proposals with the broadest prospective application, see note 8 infra.
More limited legislative efforts to supervise the functioning of individual agencies are
discussed in note 9 infra. Proposals to de-regulate industries which have traditionally
been heavily regulated are a further manifestation of the prevailing anti-administrative
mood. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1975, at 45, col. 4 (natural gas); id. Oct. 9, 1975,
at 1, col. 7 (airlines).
6. H.R. 8231, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
7. H,'R. 3658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
8. Specifically, House Bill 3658 would amend the portion of the Administrative
Procedure Act governing rulemaking procedures, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Under the
bill's provisions, any agency rule which is required to be preceded by general notice of
the proposed rulemaking and which would subject a violator to a criminal sanction would
take effect only if two conditions were met. First, the rule would have to be published
in the Federal Register at least thirty days of continuous session of Congress before it
was scheduled to take effect. Second, the thirty-day period would have to elapse without
adoption by either house of Congress of a resolution stating simply that "that House does
not favor the rule." H.R. 3658 §§ 3(f)-(g), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Exceptions
to these requirements are made for rulemaking procedures involving military or foreign
affairs, agency management or personnel, public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts. Id. § 3 (a).
Although similar in purpose, House Bill 8231 is considerably broader in scope. It
applies to "any rule or regulation to be used in the administration or implementation of
any law of the United St#tes or any program established by or under such law," as well
as to changes in such rules. H.R. 8231, § 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). No rule or
rule change could take effect for a period of sixty "legislative" days following its issuance, during which either house of Congress could veto the proposal by adopting "a
resolution in substance disapproving such rule, regulation, or change because it contains
provisions which are contrary to law or inconsistent with the intent of the Congress,
or because it goes beyond the mandate of the legislation it is designed to implement
or in the administration of which it is designed to be used." Id. § 2(b).
The procedures proposed in the two bills are markedly similar to the British practice
of requiring that administrative regulations be "laid before" Parliament for a period of
time during which they are subject to parliamentary disapproval before taking effect. See
Ginnane 584-85 & n.62; Watson 1068-70.
9. A comprehensive review of the history of the legislative oversight concept is
provided in Watson 991-1029. See also Cooper & Cooper 469-71; Ginnane 570-99.
Several recent enactments have included provisions allowing one or both houses of
Congress to veto proposed executive actions by resolution. See, e.g., Federal Election
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have been discussed at great length. 10

VETO

The present bills are unique,

however, in that they represent Congress's first attempt to institutionalize a general policy which subjects nearly all administrative regulations
to congressional veto. No court has had occasion to evaluate directly
the constitutionality of a congressional veto scheme, but the scope and
potential impact of the present bills make it likely that a prompt
constitutional challenge would ensue upon passage. This Note will
address the limited question of the probable response of the Supreme
Court to such a challenge.
The ConstitutionalQuestion

The veto provisions currently before Congress have given rise to
two types of constitutional objections.

First, it has been argued that the

congressional veto constitutes a general usurpation of the executive
function.'" Congress's authority and competence, it is asserted, are
limited to the area circumscribed by its enumerated legislative powers,1 2
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 2 U.S.C.A. § 438(c) (Supp. 1976) (providing for
single-house vetoes of regulations proposed by the Federal Election Commission);
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 753(g) (2) (Supp. I1, 1973)
(allowing either house to reject exceptions made by the President to mandatory allocation rules); Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. H8 2192-94 (Supp. 1976) (permitting
Congress to disapprove specified presidential actions by means of concurrent resolution);
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C.A. § 1403(b)
(Supp. 1976) (allowing either house to block presidential impoundment of appropriated
funds); Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C.A. § 2107 n.
(Supp. 1976) (allowing either house to disapprove implementing regulations proposed by
the General Services Administration). For a more complete listing of legislative veto
statutes, see Watson App. B.
Most recently, an amendment has been added to the Consumer Product Safety Act,
S. 644, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (currently in conference), which would allow either
house of Congress to reject regulations proposed by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission. See 121 CoNG. RFc. 10,204 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975).
10. Compare Ginnane; Schauffler, The Legislative Veto Revisited, 8 Pun. PoLIcY
296 (1958); and Watson (advocating a cautious approach to the use of the legislative
veto) with Cooper & Cooper (supporting the necessity and propriety of the veto). See
generally J. Cooper, Schauffler and the Veto: A Commentary, 8 PuB. PoLIcY 328
(1958); J. Cooper, The Legislative Veto: Its Promise and Its Perils, 7 PUB. PoLICY 128
(1956); Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of the Laws-Should
Legislators Supervise Administrators?,41 CALF. L. REv. 565 (1953).
11. See 121 CONG. REc. 10,205 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Drinan
and Mr. Eckhardt); Statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, House Hearings, Oct. 29, 1975 (373). In arguing for
the necessity of a limited executive privilege with respect to control of government secrets, the present Attorney General has also expressed the view that there is a definable
sphere of executive activity upon which Congress may not encroach. See Statement of
Attorney General Edward H. Levi before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
Feb. 6, 1976.
12. Congress's principal powers are enumerated, U.S. CONST. art. I, and the legisla-
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and any attempt by Congress to exercise control over the day-to-day
execution of laws already passed is violative of the doctrine of separation
of powers."
A second and more specific constitutional argument is that such a
provision would allow an evasion of the President's veto authority 14 in a
manner which the framers of the Constitution sought expressly to
preclude.1 5

Once Congress has created an agency and defined its

tive process is governed specifically by section 7 of that article. Incidental congressional
powers and responsibilities are provided for elsewhere in the Constitution. See, e.g.,
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2 (confirmation of presidential appointments); id. art. m, § 1
(establishment of inferior federal courts); id. art. IV, § 3 (admission of new states and
disposal of government property); id. amend. XII (congressional role in presidential
elections).
13. The Constitution does not require explicitly that the powers of the three
branches be held and exercised independently. Rather, the separation doctrine is
implicit in the system of checks and balances which the Constitution provides. It is
clear from the debate and rhetoric surrounding the framing of the Constitution that its
authors intended the enumeration of discrete and offsetting powers to result in the sort of
division of authority which Montesquieu had advocated in the abstract. See THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 47-48 (J.Madison). See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. CL 612,
682-84 (1976); 1 &2 M. FA.RAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEnmL CoNVENTON OF 1787
(1937 ed.); Watson 1030-49.
14, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7:
[2] Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with
his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated. ...
If after
such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it
shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it
shall become a Law ....
[3] Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question
of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case
of a Bill.
15. Those taking this view emphasize that the framers, in arriving at the final
version of section 7 of article I, were concerned primarily with protecting the executive,
who was seen ab representing a national constituency, against more parochial interest
groups in Congress. See THE FEDERA sT No. 73 (A. Hamilton). It is noted that the
Constitutional Convention rejected preliminary drafts of the section which appeared to
provide opportunities for congressional evasion of the President's veto by action other
than in the prescribed legislative form. It is argued that the third clause of the section,
with its mention of orders, resolutions, and votes, was added specifically to foreclose
such evasion by making all binding congressional action subject to the presidential veto.
See 5 ELLIorr's DEBATES 431 (1845).
Proponents of this analysis recognize, of course, that the third clause of section 7 of
article I applies the veto requirement only to those legislative acts "to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary." Their
argument assumes, however, necessarily with some circularity, that the text and history
of the section taken as a whole strongly imply that all significant legislative acts were
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powers, it is argued, any attempt to alter that original legislation, as by
specific restrictions on the agency's exercise of its powers, is a legislative
act equivalent to repeal or amendment which can be properly accomplished only through the full legislative process.'8 Although Congress
might legitimately delegate all of its authority in a given area to an
administrative agency, the argument continues, neither the original delegation nor any subsequent modifications can be carried out without
adherence to the constitutional scheme of shared congressional and
executive authority."'
In response to the first category of objections, it has been suggested
that in practice the separation doctrine has proven to be little more than
intended to be concurred in by both houses. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 757-58
(1976) (White, J., concurring).
The history of section 7 of article I is reviewed from this perspective in Ginnane
572-73 and Watson 1030-49. A conflicting interpretation of the historical material is
discussed in notes 16-21 infra and accompanying text.
16. This view was expressed succinctly in a memorandum drafted at the direction of
President Franklin Roosevelt by the staff of Attorney General (later Justice) Jackson.
The Lend-Lease Act, ch. 30, 55 Stat. 53 (1941), contained a provision authorizing
Congress to revoke the powers granted to the President by concurrent resolution.
Although he signed the act for foreign policy reasons, President Roosevelt supervised the
preparation of a confidential memorandum expressing his constitutional objections to the
revocation provision. Justice Jackson, acting pursuant to the late President's wishes,
released the document in 1953. Jackson, A PresidentialLegal Opinion, 66 H&Rv. L.REv.
1353, 1357-58 (1953).
17. Commentators advocating a cautious approach to the use of the congressional
veto have pointed to two specific dangers. First, one Congress, by including a veto
provision in an enabling act passed by a two-thirds majority over the President's veto,
would set the stage for subsequent Congresses to change policy against the President's
will by simple majority. Momentary peaks of congressional support for a particular
policy, it is argued, will be preserved at the expense of both future Presidents and future
members of Congress. See Watson 1030-49. Second, it has been suggested that singlehouse congressional veto provisions bring about an undesirable enhancement of the
powers of congressional minorities by undercutting the principle of bicameralism. Allowing control of administrative action by resolution of one house, it is noted, leaves
open the possibility of policy changes being made by fifty-one Senators in a Congress of
535, or by a coalition of large-state Representatives reflecting a narrow local interest.
Either of these results, the argument concludes, would directly contravene the framers'
intent, implicit in the bicameral system, to control individual self-aggrandizement and to
prevent the development of regional hegemonies. See id. at 1065-68.
Additionally, it is feared that a congressional veto provision like those proposed in
House Bill 3658 and House Bill 8231 would confuse and ultimately weaken the judicial
review process by allowing future Congresses to read their views into the legislative
histories of earlier enactments. See Statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, House Hearings, Oct. 29, 1975
(376): "And if, as seems to me the obvious design of these bills, the Congress is
to create out of whole cloth, or even-the best that can be envisioned-to summon
up out of its unrecorded institutional memory an intent that is not apparent in the
language or printed history of the original statute, then a principle of statutory construction will be violated."
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a captivating but unworkable abstraction."' It is argued that the framers of the Constitution saw the doctrine as a safeguard against the
extreme situation of tyrannical self-aggrandizement by one of the three
branches, not as an operating principle for the federal government.' 9
The recent trend in the development of intergovernmental relations is
seen as favoring cooperative intermingling of function and responsibility
among the three branches.20
The second objection, encroachment on the presidential veto
power, has been criticized for being premised on an overly literal interpretation of the veto clause itself and the debates leading to its enactment. 21 It is admitted that the primary purpose of the veto power was
to permit the President, with his national constituency, to protect minority and, ultimately, national interests against geographical or ideological coalitions riding ephemeral tides of sentiment. It is argued,
however, that the clause should be read only as a restriction on attempts
at gross evasion of the presidential review authority, and not as a limit
on congressional flexibility in implementing properly enacted legislation. 22 The proponents of this interpretation find it sufficient for Congress to meet the requirements of the veto clause once, at enactment
of the enabling legislation which authorizes the congressional veto. 28
Despite the absence of a definitive ruling, there is ample judicial
authority to be cited in support of either side of the question whether a
congressional veto provision would be an unconstitutional evasion of the
presidential veto power.24 A strict constructionist approach to this and
18. See Cooper & Cooper 479-87, 502-07.
19. See id. at 477-79, 502-07. The argument resolves itself into a question of
emphasis: is the separation of powers an affirmative doctrine with limited exceptions, or,
as these authors would have it, an abstraction which marks the periphery of a practical
policy of intermingling? See note 13 eupra.
20. See Cooper & Cooper 488-99. The authors suggest that the congressional veto is
substantively indistinguishable from other, admittedly legitimate means of legislative
oversight. For example, Congress can significantly influence agency policy by exercising its control over agency budgets, or by threatening repeal or amendment of agency
enabling acts. See also J.Cooper, The Legislative Veto, supra note 10, at 134-36. But
see Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966) (invalidation of administrative
decision because of undue congressional influence). For recent examples of the intermingling trend, see the statutes cited in note 9 supra.
21. See Cooper & Cooper 477-79.

22. Id.
23. Id. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 757 (1976) (White, J., concurring);
121 CoNe. REc. 10,206 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Levitas).
24. The remarks of Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure Case concerning the general
issue of separation of powers are equally applicable to the narrower question considered
here: "Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they
foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharoah. A century and a half of
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other problems which arise under the separation of powers doctrine
finds support in a series of cases dating back to Reconstruction. In
United States v. Klein,25 the Court vigorously defended the independence of the President's pardon power in striking down a law which
provided that a presidential pardon alone was insufficient evidence of
26
the loyalty of a claimant to property confiscated during the Civil War.
Nine years later, in Kilbourn v. Thompson,27 the Court rejected an
attempt by the House of Representatives to punish for contempt a
witness called to testify in a matter not directly related to the House's
legislative duties. After Kilbourn had refused to respond to a subpoena
directing him to testify and to produce certain documents regarding
private real estate dealings, the house ordered the Sergeant-at-Arms to
arrest him. The Court found that the House's action constituted an
unwarranted attempt to extend its internal rulemaking power. The net
effect of permitting such action, the Court concluded, would be to allow
Congress to achieve substantive legislative ends without recourse to the
28
legislative process, a clear violation of the separation doctrine.
partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or
less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any question. They largely
cancel each other. And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice of
dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way." Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court came perhaps closest to deciding the constitutionality of the
congressional veto in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).

See generally

Cooper & Cooper 469 n.9. Sibbach involved a challenge to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which were promulgated under Supreme Court direction and'took effect upon
the passage of a stipulated period of time without congressional disapproval. The Court
not only upheld the Rules, but even praised the veto provision as a measure "employed to
make sure that the action under the delegation squares with the congressional purpose."
312 U.S. at 15. Despite the superficial relevance of the case, however, a decision
regarding a rare use by Congress of special judicial expertise would not appear to control
issues arising along the active and traditionally sensitive legislative/executive interface.
The Court has very recently suggested, without reference to Sibbach, that the legislative
veto question remains open. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct 612, 692 n.176 (1976).
25. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
26. Id. at 147-48. The Court found the law objectionable as both an unwarranted
encroachment upon the pardon power and an interference with its own right to decide
cases on appeal. The Court of Claims had original jurisdiction over the claimants'
actions, with direct review by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the law
amounted to an effort "to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular
way." Id. at 146. With respect to the pardon power, the Court stated: "It is the
intention of the Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the
government-the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial-shall be, in its sphere,
independent of the others. To the executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon, and
it is granted without limit." Id. at 147. See also Waymen v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1,46 (1825).
27. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
28. The Court stressed that "the President isso far made a part of the legislative
power, that his assent isrequired to the enactment of all statutes and resolutions of
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Early in this century the Court twice affirmed its support for strict
separation of powers in the federal government. In Myers v. United
States,0 the President's authority to remove "Officers of the United
States" 0 without congressional approval was upheld. The Court noted
that Congress's powers are specifically enumerated in the Constitution,
while those of the executive are broadly implied, and inferred from this

comparison a general presumption in favor of the executive in conflict
situations."' And in Springer v. PhilippineIslands,"2 a case technically
decided under the Philippine Organic Act,33 but actually reasoned
according to principles of American constitutional law, the Court found
legislators constitutionally disqualified to hold positions in an executive
agency.3 4 The doctrine of separation of powers was described as a
"general rule inherent in the American constitutional system." 35 More
Congress." Id. at 191 (emphasis added). Compare the quoted language with Justice
White's suggestion in Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. CL 612, 657-58 (1976) (White, J.,
concurrifg), that there is a category of quasi-legislative congressional action, sufficiently
"legislative" to avoid conflict under the separation of powers doctrine, but not so
"legislative" as to require submission to the President for his assent or veto. See note 44
infra.
29. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). The President removed Myers, a first-class postmaster,
before the expiration of his statutory four-year term. Myers sued to recover his salary
for the remainder of his term, but his challenge to the President's action was rejected.
The Court held that the act of removal was a purely executive function, in spite of
Congress's constitutional authority to vest the appointment of inferior officers in persons
other than the President, and to define the term and tenure of such officers. Id. at 161.
See generally Bruff, PresidetialExemption From Mandatory Retirement of Members of
the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 1976 Dvxn L.J. 249.
30. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2.

31. 272 U.S. at 128:
It is reasonable to suppose also that, had it been intended to give Congress
power to regulate or control removals in the manner suggested, it would have
been included among the specifically enumerated legislative powers in Article
I,or in the specific limitations on the executive power in Article II ....
The fact that the executive power is given in general terms strengthened by
specific terms where emphasis is appropriate, and limited by direct expressions
where limitation is needed and that no express limit is placed on the power of
removal by the executive, is a convincing indication that none was intended.
32. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
33. Ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545 (1916).
34. The Court struck down an act of the Philippine legislature creating a national
coal company and vesting the power to vote the company's stock in a board consisting of
the Governor General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines. The Court held that this effort to appoint legislative
officials to executive positions violated the separation of powers principle implicit in the
Philippine Organic Act. 277 U.S. at 199-203. With respect to the relation between the
Organic Act and the American constitutional system, the Court commented, "[tihus the
Organic Act, following the rule established by the American constitutions, both state and
federal, divides the government into three separate departments-the legislative, executive and judicial." Id. at 201. The Court therefore found it appropriate to decide the case
solely by reference to American judicial precedent.
35. 277 U.S. at 201. Two further aspects of the Springer case are incidentally
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recently, the Court has occupied the same philosophical ground in
rejecting a congressional effort to cede continental shelf acreage to a state
by concurrent resolution in defiance of presidential opposition,3 6 and in
its famous denial of the President's authority to seize and operate private
steel mills pursuant to his war powers.3 7
The more flexible, less literal judicial approach to the separation
doctrine has its roots in an eighteenth century holding that a constitutional amendment approved by two-thirds of Congress need not be
submitted to presidential scrutiny.3 8 It was not until the first of the
leading twentieth century cases, however, that the Court again adopted
this approach, when it referred to the permissibility of one branch's
seeking the "assistance" of another in upholding a congressional delegation of its tariff authority to the President.3 9 Then, in Humphrey's
relevant to the congressional veto question. First, the Court determined that the
functions of the members of the coal board were in fact executive by a process of
elimination, ruling out the possibility of their being either legislative or judicial in nature.
The Court concluded, "[t]he fact that they do not fall within the authority of either one
of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the
remaining one of the three among which the powers of government are divided." Id. at
202-03. Since the powers of the legislature are carefully enumerated in the Constitution,
while those of the executive are determined on an implied or residual basis, adopting this
mode of analysis would have the effect of enhancing the presumption in favor of the
executive in conflict situations.
Second, the Court found that long acquiescence by the U.S. Congress in the
Philippine practice in question, where Congress had power to annul Philippine statutes,
was insufficient support for an otherwise unconstitutional law. Id. at 208-09. This
reasoning may be applicable by analogy to the situation of long acquiescence by the
executive in congressional usurpation of its powers. See note 20 supra and sources cited
therein.
36. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1946). The Court rejected the
argument that this particular congressional action was excepted from presidential review
by the constitutional grant of power to Congress to dispose of public lands. Id. at 28;
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See notes 54-56 infra and accompanying text.
37. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Here
again the Court suggested that a history of acquiescence by the victim of interbranch
usurpation was not controlling. Id. at 586-89.
38. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
39. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). In Hampton, a
classic delegation case, the Court upheld a provision of the Tariff Act of 1922 which
allowed the President to adjust duties in order to equalize production cost differentials
between foreign and domestic manufacturers. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 315, 42
Stat. 858. With respect to separation of powers, the Court noted that "it is a breach of
the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it
to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it attempts to invest itself or its
members with either executive power or judicial power." This was seen as a flexible
rule, however, as the Court allowed that one branch might "invoke the action of the
other two branches." The permissible extent of such intermingling was held to be a
relative question, "fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the
governmental co-ordination." 276 U.S. at 406. See also Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944).
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Executor v. United States,40 the Court limited its earlier holding in

Myers, deciding that Congress could in fact circumscribe the President's
removal authority with respect to offices which Congress had created to
function independently. 4 Finally, in Currin v. Wallace,42 the Court
took perhaps its most expansive view of the constitutional restrictions on
the legislative process, allowing Congress to condition the operability of
an administrative regulation on a referendum vote by the affected
citizens.
The PresentCourt'sProbableApproach
The conflicting precedents, then, would seem to permit the Court
great flexibility in dealing with a constitutional challenge to the proposed veto bills. However, language in one of the least publicized

portions of Buckley v. Valeo,43 the recent case involving the Federal
40. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
41. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970) provides for
presidential appointment of commissioners for fixed terms, with removal before the
expiration of a term allowed only for cause. Humphrey was appointed by President
Hoover for a term expiring in 1938. Upon taking office in 1933, President Roosevelt
sought unsuccessfully to elicit Humphrey's resignation, and then announced Humphrey's
removal, giving as a reason only his desire to have the Commission manned by his own
appointees. Humphrey died shortly thereafter and his executor sued to collect salary not
paid following the "removal." The Court allowed recovery, holding that although the
President's appointment power was unlimited, Congress might legitimately restrict his
removal authority where the duties of the agency involved "are performed without
executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute, must be free from executive
control." 295 U.S. at 628. Accord, Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
42. 306 U.S. 1, 16 (1939). The Court rejected a complex constitutional attack on
the Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935, 7 U.S.C. §§ 511 et seq. (1970), which authorizes
the Secretary of Agriculture to designate auction markets and to regulate sales through
the designated markets. Id. § 51Id. In the portion of the case pertinent to this
discussion, the Court upheld a provision that no market designation would be effective
unless it were approved by two-thirds of those voting in a referendum taken among the
affected growers. Although Currin was technically a delegation case, the extent of
legislative involvement in the implementation of the statute which the Court permitted
contrasts markedly with the attitude toward the functioning of the respective branches
which the Court took in the cases discussed in notes 26-37 supra.
43. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976). The case dealt with a multi-faceted
constitutional attack on the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et
seq. (Supp. I1, 1973), as amended, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 83 Stat. 1263. In addition to its holding in Part IV of the
opinion, discussed here, the Court upheld provisions of the Act and Amendments which
require extensive disclosure and recordkeeping, and establish the federal income tax
checkoff system for collecting public election funds. The Court struck down limitations
on personal expenditures by candidates and their supporters as violative of the first
amendment. The specific question of the Act's congressional veto provision, see note 9
supra, was raised by the plaintiffs, but the Court found the question mooted by its other
determinations. 96 S. Ct. at 692 n.176.
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Election Campaign Act, suggests the likelihood of the Court's rejecting
a veto provision in the form of the bills currently before Congress. In
Part IV of Buckley, the Court held the organization and functioning of
the Federal Election Commission to be unconstitutional with respect to
all but its information-gathering duties. 44 The Court found an untenable conflict between the status of the Commission members as important
44. The Court's opinion was rendered per curiam, with Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Marshall and White writing qualified concurrences. Justice Stevens did not
participate in the decision. All but Justice White concurred fully in Part IV. Justice
White joined in the Court's findings regarding the composition of the Commission, with
minor reservations, 96 S. Ct. at 749, but added a comment on the congressional veto
provision. After discussing the separation doctrine and the apparent purpose of the
executive veto, he concluded that "the provision for congressional disapproval of agency
regulations does not appear to transgress the constitutional design, at least where the
President has agreed to legislation establishing the disapproval procedure or the legislation has been passed over his veto." Id. at 758.
The analysis of this Note assumes that the Court would resolve a challenge to a
broad congressional veto law by directly confronting the constitutional issues involved.
The reasoning underlying Justice White's conclusion, however, provides a model for
resolving such a challenge by circumventing the separation of powers and veto clause
questions. Justice White found the veto clause inapplicable because the congressional
veto over the Commission's actions was not fully legislative in nature: "Congressional
influence over the substantive content of agency regulation may be enhanced but I would
not view the power of either House to disapprove as equivalent to legislation or to an
order, resolution or vote requiring the concurrence of both Houses." Id. at 757. For
purposes of the separation doctrine, however, Justice White implied that the congressional veto was legislative to the extent that it did not conflict with the prerogatives of either
the executive or judicial branches: "I would be much more concerned if Congress
purported to usurp the functions of law enforcement, to control the outcome of particular
adjudications, or to pre-empt the President's appointment power... " Id. at 758.
Justice White, then, attributed a vague intermediate status to the congressional veto
provision: legislative for purposes of satisfying the separation doctrine, but sufficiently
non-legislative to avoid the requirements of the veto clause. The analysis gives rise to
two immediate objections. First, the logic employed is severely strained, depending as it
does on the existence of a narrow quasi-legislative category of government functions.
Second, and most important, it is difficult to see how Justice White reconciled his
conclusion here with his concurrence in the Court's finding that the Commissions
enforcement power was "authority that cannot possibly be regarded as merely in aid of
the legislative function of Congress," id. at 691, and in the Court's strong statement of
the separation doctrine. In light of these conflicts, the only reasonable interpretation of
Justice White's comment on the congressional veto provision is that it represents an
indirect pulling back from the Court's strict view of the principle of separation of
powers. Justice White's argument might, therefore, be successfully urged on a lower
court inclined to take a more flexible view of the separation doctrine than the present
Supreme Court, but unwilling to challenge the Court's language in Buckley.
In any event, it is uncertain whether Justice White would consider a general statute
imposing a Congressional veto provision retroactively on all administrative enabling acts
to be within his concept of "legislation establishing [a] disapproval procedure," id. at
758, for purposes of meeting the requirements of the veto clause. Accordingly, the
predictive analysis developed here will apply only to those Justices concurring fully in
Part IV of the Courts opinion.
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"Officers of the United States" and the statutory provision calling for the
appointment of a majority of the members by Congress rather than the
President.45 In its statement of general principles, its selection and use
of illustrative authority, and its comments on particular constitutional
provisions, the Court evinced a literal respect both for the separation
doctrine itself and for the sections of the Constitution which lend
substance to it.
In setting forth the philosophical premises which it saw as controlling, the Court turned to those writings of Madison which reflect the
strictest view of the separation doctrine taken at the time of the drafting

and ratification of the Constitution. 46 Although recognizing that "the
Constitution by no means contemplates total separation of each of these
three essential branches of government," 47 the Court went on to quote
Chief Justice Taft in Hampton & Co. v. United States48 to the effect that
"'the rule is that in the actual administration of the Government Congress or the Legislature should exercise the legislative power, the President or the state executive, the Governor, the executive power, and the
courts or the judiciary the judicial power. . .. ,1' The conclusion of
the quoted passage allowed for the possibility of interbranch coopera-

tion, but clearly subordinated it to the principle of independence:
"[T]his is not to say that the three branches are not co-ordinate parts
of one government and that each in the field of its duties may not
invoke the action of the other two branches in so far as the action
involved shall not be an assumption of the constitutional field of action
of another branch."5 0

Finally, the Court illustrated the principles it had expounded by refer45. 96 S. Ct. at 685-93; Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub.
L No. 93-443, § 310, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280. The appointments clause, U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2, provides as follows:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The Court held that the clause forbade congressional appointment of "Officers" exercising rulemaking and enforcement powers like those delegated to the Commission. 96 S.
Ct. at 690-93.
46. id. at 683, quoting THE FMDMALIST No. 47 at 302-03 (G.P. Putnam's Sons
ed. 1889) (J. Madison); cf. Cooper & Cooper 502-07. See note 11 supra.
47. 96 S. Ct.at 683.
48. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
49. 96 S. Ct. at 683, quoting Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406
(1928) (emphasis added).
50. 96 S.Ct. at 683, quoting Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406
(1928) (emphasis added).
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ence to a series of cases which took a strong position in favor of the
autonomy of the three branches. 51
In analyzing the text of the appointments clause of the Constitution,52 the Court attached great significance to the action of the framers
in rejecting appointment power in the legislative branch, and inferred

from the deliberate action of the draftsmen an intent to have the clause
taken at its literal face value. 53 The Court summarily rejected the
argument that Congress's general authority to supervise elections,54 read
in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause, 55 created an exception to the appointments clause applicable to the facts of this case. The
Court held that
tt]he position that because Congress has been given explicit and plenary
authority to regulate a field of activity, it must therefore have the power
to appoint those who are to administer the regulatory statute is both
novel and contrary to the language of the Appointments Clause."

Significantly, the same analytical approach would be applicable in
the case of a constitutional challenge to a congressional veto statute.
Like the appointment clause, the presidential veto provision of the
51. 96 S. Ct. at 684, citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928); United States v. Ferreira,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (nonjudi.
cial duties may not be imposed on a judge holding office under article M of the
Constitution).
Attorney General Levi has recently expressed the view that the Buckley opinion
reflects a strong commitment to the separation doctrine, stating that
[t]he limits upon the powers of the respective Branches are distinctions of degree. Each branch has at times crossed into the area of another, and I suggest
the Framers assumed a certain flexibility in this regard. But recognition of
the constraints of the principle is required of all branches ....
The line
must be drawn. The Supreme Court drew that line in Buckley ....
Statement of Attorney General Edward H. Levi before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, Feb. 6, 1976.
Further evidence of the present Court's belief in the vitality of the separation
doctrine can be found in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702-07 (1974). In
Nixon, although the Court found a claim of executive privilege based on the separation
doctrine to be insufficient grounds for denying a federal district judge the right to make
an in camera inspection of presidential tapes and documents, the doctrine itself received
strong support. Another aspect of the separation principle provided a collateral rationale
for the Court's holding, since it was found that the executive privilege claim, if allowed,
would interfere with the judiciary's authority to decide criminal cases.
52. U.S. CoNsr. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2 (quoted in note 45 supra).
53. 96 S. Ct. at 687-88. The Court noted that the strengthening of the appointments clause was part of an overall effort to fortify the executive branch against
legislative encroachment. See J. MADisoN, NoTEs OF DEBATES iN THE FEEAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 385-91, 472, 521, 527, 573-75 (Ohio Univ. Press ed. 1966); Watson
1040-43.
54. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 4.
55. Id. art I, § 8, cl. 18.

56. 96 S. Ct. at 688.
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Constitution was the result of lengthy deliberation involving the rejection of alternatives which threatened to promote congressional evasion."?
As in Buckley, it is argued in this context that other related grants of
power to Congress combine to erode the literal impact of the applicable
constitutional restrictions.5" Reasoning by inference from the structure
of the Court's argument in Buckley, one can conclude that the Court
would react in a similar way to a congressional veto statute which also
conflicts with a parallel express constitutional limitation on congressional power.
In reaching its strict construction of the appointments clause, the
Court had to balance two conflicting judicial precedents, and its handling of them is instructive. The first of the relevant cases, Myers v.
United States,5" had given unequivocal support to the President's control
over "the executive power of the Government, i.e. the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers .... 60 The later case of
Humphrey's Executor v. United States"' suggested the existence of a
general exception to the President's absolute authority under the appointments and removal clause where the duties of the officer concerned required him to have substantial independence from the executive branch in order to function effectively. At minimum, the language
of the case left open the opportunity for a subsequent court to define
such an exception explicitly.0 2
It was argued on behalf of the Commission in Buckley that the
need for independence which had influenced the Court in Humphrey's
Executor was especially pressing, "since the administration of the Act
57. See note 15 supra. The text of the veto provision, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, is
quoted in note 14 supra.
58. See Cooper &Cooper 477, 402.
59. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
60. Id. at 163-64. See notes 29-31 supra.
61. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
62. Although the decision turned on Congress's ability to limit the President's
removal power alone, the strong language used by the Court in limiting Myers (see notes
29-31 supra and accompanying text) would seem susceptible of broad extension:
"Whether the power of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the authority
of Congress to condition the power by fixing a definite term and precluding a removal
except for cause, will depend on the character of the office; the Myers decision,
affirming the power of the President alone to make the removal, is confined to purely
executive officers." Id. at 631-32. For subsequent courts utilizing Humphrey's Executor
as precedent, the question is again one of emphasis: the case might be cited simply as
clear authority for circumscription of the President's removal authority in particular
circumstances, or it might be employed more expansively as support for the proposition
that an agency's purpose and function will have considerable bearing on its general
constitutional standing.
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would undoubtedly have a bearing on any incumbent President's campaign for reelection." 63 The Buckley court chose not to take advantage
of the opening left by Humphrey's Executor, however. Instead, it
emphasized that the specific holding in that case was limited to the
removal power alone, and therefore not applicable to the appointment
question raised in Buckley."4
Analogous arguments would again be likely in a case involving a
congressional veto statute. Proponents of the bills now before Congress
have contended that the close relationship between the executive and the
regulatory agencies has contributed to a neglect of practical considerations and public concerns on the part of the agencies.6 5 Presumably,
reference would be made to this problem in urging on the Court a
flexible approach to the separation doctrine like that taken in Humphrey's Executor. In light of the foregoing considerations, however, the
most reasonable inference is that the Court would reiterate the limited
applicability of Humphrey's Executor and refuse to extend its general
analysis to other constitutional provisions.
Finally, the Court determined that the Federal Election Commission could continue to function as presently composed in the very
limited area of aiding Congress in performing the traditionally legislative tasks of investigation and gathering information.66 The Court drew
a clear distinction between these functions and "the more substantial
powers exercised by the Commission' which fell within the sphere of the
executive branch.6 7 Although this conclusion might seem obvious at
first impression, it must be remembered that it necessarily implies a
belief in the disputed premise that two centuries of assumption and
acquiescence among the branches have not obliterated the distinctions in
power and function on which the separation doctrine rests.6 8 It is
significant that the historical trend toward intermingling of the branches
has not dissuaded the present Court from the validity of the proposition
that "'[l]egislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the
authorityto make laws, but not to enforce them.' "69
63. 96 S. Ct. at 689. The Court noted that the same argument would also apply to
the need for the Commission to be independent of Congress. Id.
64. Id. at 690. See also id. at 753-54 (White, J., concurring).
65. See Statement of Harold E. Ford, 'Executive Director, Southeastern Poultry &
Egg Ass'n, House Hearings, Oct. 23, 1975 (208); 121 CoNG. REc. 10,204 (daily ed.
Oct. 22, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Butler).

66. 96 S. Ct. at 690-93.
67. Id. at 691.

68. See Cooper & Cooper 507-08; Ginnane 572.
69. 96 S. Ct. at 692, quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202

(1928) (emphasis added).

300

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1976:285

Conclusion
Despite the Court's disclaimer,7 0 the analysis developed here suggests that in Buckley v. Valeo the Supreme Court in fact took a
significant step toward resolving the constitutionality of the congressional veto of administrative action. The statement of philosophical premises and principles of construction necessary to the Buckley decision is
strong evidence of a strict view of the doctrine of separation of powers
and an unwillingness to dilute the literal meaning of the constitutional
provisions in which the doctrine is embodied. To uphold the constitutionality of a congressional veto provision like one of those now before
Congress would be virtually impossible without doing violence to the
language and logic of the lengthy, carefully reasoned, and politically
sensitive Buckley decision.
70. 96 S. Ct. at 692 n.176.

